competencies is found to be one of the main motives for cross-border acquisitions in the 1990s but is not a factor in domestic acquisitions over the same period.
Introduction
The entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty in 1993 was an important step for strengthening the European Economic Union. The treaty paved the way for European Monetary Union and set up the transition of the European Community towards a single integrated market. Most existing technical, regulatory, legal, bureaucratic, and protectionist barriers were eliminated to make way for the free movement of goods, capital and labor. One of the expected benefits of the common market and single currency was to spur innovation and to foster the emergence of innovative firms which operate across European borders. Mergers and acquisitions (M&As) across borders were an important way for firms to respond to the incentives set by the establishment of the integrated market. This paper investigates how innovativeness affected merger activity in the European market after 1993.
Economically, the deepening of the European Economic Union and the agreement on a roadmap for monetary union can be seen as a shock to the economic environment as it changed the optimal factor allocation in European markets. The dismantling of barriers to the free movement of goods, capital and labor made some assets less productive in their current use than they would be in an alternative use. M&As are an important and fast means of rearranging productive assets towards equilibrium (Hall, 1988a; Rousseau, 2002, 2004) . M&As were therefore, unsurprisingly, central in the European restructuring process following the implementation of the various single market directives. Subsequent national and European Union (EU) deregulation measures made national borders increasingly obsolete (WIR, 2000; Kleinert and Klodt, 2000; Sleuwaegen and Valentini, 2006; Torstensson, 1999 competencies is found to be one of the main motives for cross-border acquisitions in the 1990s but was not a factor for domestic acquisitions over the same period.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews related literature. Section 3 describes the data and shows descriptive statistics.
Section 4 presents our empirical approach, and Section 5 shows the empirical results. Section 6 concludes.
Literature Review
With merger activities growing in terms of numbers, value and geographical scope, and competition being increasingly based on technical inventions (Amable and Verspagen, 1995) , the relationship between M&As and technologies has received increasing attention in the academic literature.
Veugelers (2006) provides an overview of recent advances in the fields of economics and management. Her survey shows that empirical contributions investigating the relationship between M&As and technologies are scarce for
Europe (Veugelers, 2006) . This is particularly the case for cross-border M&As Bertrand and Zuniga, 2006) . This section reviews the existing literature on M&A and innovation and derives implications for cross-border acquisitions.
The industrial organization literature identifies enhances in market power by means of increasing barriers to entry (Comanor, 1967) and Jacquemin, 1988; Arrow, 1962) .
A merger provides the opportunity to reorganize and integrate both firms' research units (Banal-Estanol and Seldeslachts, 2005) , hence enabling duplication of research to be avoided (Veugelers, 2006) . Technology M&As for market power reasons aim at reducing technology competition (Arrow, 1962; Reinganum, 1983) and pre-empting competition in technology markets (Grimpe and Hussinger, 2008) .
From a more managerial perspective, technology-motivated acquisitions can enable the acquiring firm to gain or regain contact to the research frontier in their field of competence (Kamien, 1992 Giuri et al. (2006) find that 20% of the patent applications at the European Patent Office (EPO) are filed to block competitors.
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Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 (Granstrand and Sjölander, 1990, Cantwell et al., 2004 Keeping in mind that knowledge flows tend to be significantly stronger within countries than across borders (Jaffe et al., 1993; Eaton and Kortum, 1999; Branstetter, 2001) , M&As are held to be of particular importance for cross-border technology acquisitions. Global technology sourcing has been found to be crucial for securing competitive advantages (Driffield and Love, 2005; Sofka, 2005) as firms can realize significant technology spillovers from industrialized economies (van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie and Lichtenberg, 2001; Love, 2003; Driffield and Love, 2005; Sofka, 2005) . M&A as one way of foreign direct investment (FDI) is an effective instrument to access foreign technological capabilities and knowledge (Neary, 2004; Kuemmerle, 1999) .
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The opening of European markets stimulated engagement in FDI (Petroulas, 2007) and hence M&As. In a recent study, Bertrand and Zitouna (2008) , Furthermore, 23% of the merger deals occur between innovative firms, in the sense that both firms applied for an EPO patent at least once in the premerger period. Based on patent information, we calculate technological proximity T ij of the patent portf oli os of the M&A partners i and j as the uncentered correlation measure introduced to the patent literature by Jaffe
The acquiring and target firms' technology portfolios are described by F i and 
The constant depreciation rate of knowledge δ is set to 0.15, as is common in the literature (e.g. Hall, 1990 . In order to assure that size differences of the patent cross-border M&As in the average value of the proximity measure. However, 24% of the cross-border deals occur between firms with a technological overlap in patent portfolios larger than zero, whereas at 17% this share is smaller for cross-border deals.
Insert Table 1 here
In total, the share of cross-border mergers in our sample is 38%. 5 Figure 1 shows that the percentage of announced cross-border M&As in our sample increased after 1994, but did not vary significantly over the following years.
This pattern of our sample of public firms only reflects the development of all Table 2 shows that public firms in the UK, France and Germany were also most active in acquiring foreign public firms and most 5 The share is even larger if we account for M&As between European and non-European firms. The distance between two countries can also be seen as a measure for the physical costs of trade (DiGiovanni, 2005) . We proxy geographical distance by the distance between the capital cities of both M&A partners' home countries.
In addition to a dummy for cross-bordership, a common language indicator and a distance measure, we use macroeconomic indicators to account for relative country advantages of the target' s countries over the acquiring firm' s country that potentially help explain cross-border mergers:
6
-GDP (at current prices) measures the size of the target firm' s national market.
-Average unit labor costs (ULC) in the manufacturing sector are an indication of the target firm' s production cost in its local market.
-R&D spending over GDP accounts for the target firm countries' technology intensity. On the one hand, R&D-intensive countries can be attractive for technology sourcing firms eager to learn. On the other hand, R&D intensive firms might acquire targets in countries with a relatively low R&D intensity in order to siphon off profits from their technologies (Dunning, 1988) . -The openness of an economy is defined as the sum of its exports and import volume over GDP, hence indicating its accessibility by trade.
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-Lastly, the top statutory tax rates on corporate income account for the tax advantages of the target' s home country over the acquirer' s home country.
All country variables are measured relative to the acquiring firm' s home country in order to control for comparative advantages of the target' s home market. Table 1 shows that the mean values of the relative country characteristics are close to one, which means that there is little difference between the countries of the acquiring and target firm with respect to those variables. T-tests, however, show that the means are statistically significantly different from one at the 1% level of statistical significance; for relative UCL, at the 5% level. This indicates that the target firm' s country is, on average, larger, more R&D-intensive, more expensive in terms of labor costs and taxes and more open than the acquiring firm' s home country.
Empirical Model
As it is difficult to assess the direct impact of M&As on innovation behavior (Veugelers, 2005) 7 , our empirical model investigates the expected value from acquiring technological assets (Hall, 1988a) . We analyze the decision to acquire a certain firm depending on its assets and characteristics.
Following Hall (1988a) , firms are defined in a hedonic way as bundles of their assets, characteristics and relative home country (dis-)advantages X. The value of a target firm V is a function of X. In the presence of efficient markets and full information, V(X i ) equals the price at which i' s asset bundle is traded.
7 For example, a post-merger increase in R&D can indicate duplicated research efforts in the integration phase or exploitation of synergies; and decreases in post-merger R&D can indicate an efficiency or a market power effect. In addition, those effects are transitory and it is even more difficult to identify lon-term effects of M&As. Acquisitions, however, take place at a significant positive premium over preannouncement stock value (Jensen and Ruback, 1983) indicating that some agents place a higher value on a firm's assets bundle X i than the market. The acquiring firm is assumed to act as a bidder. A new bid above the current trading price occurs because the acquiring firm has revealed new information about the value of the potential acquisition target' s assets. It is, further, assumed that an acquiring firm j can acquire any other firm i. If an acquisition occurs, the increment to the value of firm j is V j (X i ). Thus, j acquires i if j 's net gain from the acquisition of i is positive and larger than the net gain from a merger with any other potential target k:
P j denotes the price of i' s assets and C refers to the entire pool of firms.
An advantage of the model is that prices are endogenous in the sense that the price paid for a certain target varies depending on the potential acquirer.
The price at which firms value the target is assumed to be a function of the target firm's characteristics V(X i ). Separating j' s net profit from the acquisition into observable and unobservable components yields:
Assuming that the error terms ε ij are independent and homoscedastic, (4) can be estimated by a conditional logit model: where the value function f is specified as the difference between the valuation of the acquiring firm v j and the equilibrium price v at which the firm' s assets will be traded:
Small letters correspond to the observable components of V and V j . The value function f(X i , X j ), including the characteristics of the acquiring and target firm and the distance between them in characteristics space, is specified as:
The vector of characteristics X i n c l u d e s t h e t a r g e t ' s t o t a l a s s e t s a n d intangible assets, the difference in total assets and intangible assets over total assets between the M&A partners, a control variable for being in the same two-, three and four-digit SIC industry and relative country characteristics as defined in the previous section. In addition, the patent stock of acquisition targets and the overlap of the merging firms' technology portfolios account for the attractiveness of innovative assets and the effect of technological relatedness on the conditional probability of becoming acquired. Technological proximity is taken into account separately for domestic and cross-border deals in order to test whether the importance of technology assets differs between domestic and cross-border acquisitions.
9
The estimation of the model above is problematic because it is assumed that an acquiring firm can choose the acquisition target from a huge pool of possible acquisition targets including every public firm in Europe. This huge set of choices causes technical problems for the estimation. For this reason, a subset 8 Harrison (2006) uses a similar model to investigate hospital merger formation. 9 The assets and characteristics of the acquiring firm cancel each other out through the econometric implementation of the model. Table 3 for the test results).
10 Hall (1988b) investigates how the size of the control group affects the outcome of conditional logit models. She finds that an increase in the number of observations from 7 to 50 leads to an efficiency gain of about 30 percent based on a comparison of the standard errors. 11 As the number of public limited companies per country provided by the Amadeus database does not match the stock exchange statistics provided by the World Federation of Exchanges, we put the restriction on our sampling routine to randomly draw a percentage of firms from every country according to the stock exchanges' overall figures. 
Estimation Results
The estimation results of the conditional logit model for the choice of the acquisition target are presented in Table 3 . The coefficients describe how the target' s assets and characteristics affect the probability of being acquired. In order to show that our results are robust with respect to the randomly drawn control group of alternative M&A targets, we present the regression results for two different control groups of alternative acquisition targets. The estimated coefficients are robust for the different control groups.
12
With respect to technological assets, the regression results show that the expected net gain from an acquisition decreases the larger the patent stock of the acquisition target is. This finding is in line with Hall (1988a) , who finds a negative impact of the R&D intensity on the probability of being acquired. A possible explanation is that firms with a large patent stock are more expensive than comparable firms without patents. The net value of an acquisition of an inventive firm for the acquiring firm is hence likely to be relatively low compared to the net value of firms with few or no patents if the acquiring firm is not explicitly aiming for the target' s technologies. Another possible explanation is that patents might facilitate market-based technology licensing rather than firm acquisitions.
Focusing on the attractiveness of cross-border targets in an integrated market, our results show that acquisitions across borders are more attractive than domestic M&As. As expected, this effect is larger for M&A targets in countries that share the same language and decreases in inverse proportion to the distance between the countries. Speaking the same language and having a 12 We also estimated a nested logit model as an additional robustness check. The results were very similar. should have the necessary specific absorptive capacity to make use of each other' s knowledge. Moreover, a target firm in the same technology field can be attractive as the acquiring firm can gain access to important intellectual property rights, which can be necessary to continue research on a particular technology or to gain or regain contact to the research frontier through M&As.
Technology relatedness is, however, only important for cross-border M&As, whereas it is not a factor in domestic M&As. This suggests that national M&As 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 Thus, the empirical finding that technological relatedness is important for cross-border mergers but not for domestic M&As illustrates the importance of technologies for reorganizing the integrated European market in the 1990s.
Insert Table 3 here
With respect to the control variables it turns out that firm size as measured in logarithms of total assets (Log(A)), for example, has a significant positive impact on the probability of becoming acquired. This reflects the fact that the 1994-2000 period saw growth in the number and value of M&A deals (Sleuwaegen and Valentini, 2006) and is referred to as a period of " mega mergers" for Europe (Kleinert and Klodt, 2000) . The positive relationship between firm size and the probability of becoming acquired can reflect not only market power objectives but also better access to refinancing from banks and international capital markets. A large gap between the acquiring firm and the target firm in terms of size, defined as the difference between their log total assets (∆logA), reduces the likelihood of a merger. Further, there is no robust, significant effect of the target' s intangible assets over total assets (I/A) and the distance in that ratio between acquirer and target (∆I/A). Lastly, not surprisingly, the regression results show the importance of output market relatedness for the acquisition decision (Hall, 1988a; Cassiman et al. 2005) .
Firms in the same two-digit SIC industry sector are more likely to become acquired than firms in another industry. The effect is even larger when the target is active in the same more narrowly defined industry sector, such as in the same three-digit and four-digit SIC industry. Hence, there were no tendencies to form conglomerates through M&As in the 1990s, unlike in the 1980s.
Discussion
Following the establishment of European Economic and Monetary Union, M&As across European borders became an important tool for reorganization of the European market (WIR, 2000 , Kleinert and Klodt, 2000 , Sleuwaegen and Valentini, 2006 A limitation of this study is that we cannot compare M&A activities after 1993 with earlier periods since we do not have access to time series of sufficient length. However, we can refer to previous studies that showed an increase in cross-border mergers in the 1990s (e.g. WIR, 2000) and an increase in FDI after the introduction of the euro (Petroulas, 2007) . We are also unable to show whether a shift in acquisition strategies took place following the opening up of markets. Lastly, it would be interesting to see if European integration has a positive effect on R&D activities, as the expected benefits might not match the actual benefits (Stoneman, 1978) . 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 
